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Abstract
Along with the advent of deep neural networks came various
methods of exploitation, such as fooling the classifier or con-
taminating its training data. Another such attack is known as
model extraction, where provided API access to some black
box neural network, the adversary extracts the underlying
model. This is done by querying the model in such a way
that the underlying neural network provides enough infor-
mation to the adversary to be reconstructed. While several
works have achieved impressive results with neural network
extraction in the propositional domain, this problem has not
yet been considered over the relational domain, where data
samples are no longer considered to be independent and iden-
tically distributed (iid). Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are a
popular deep learning framework to perform machine learn-
ing tasks over relational data. In this work, we formalize an
instance of GNN extraction, present a solution with prelim-
inary results, and discuss our assumptions and future direc-
tions.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been substantial effort in apply-
ing deep learning models to graphs, culminating in a vari-
ety of different GNN architectures (Kipf and Welling 2017;
Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec 2017; Velicˇkovic´ et al. 2018;
Xu et al. 2019). With these newmodels, come new adversar-
ial approaches to decrease performance in production mod-
els (evasion attack) or contaminate training data in an unde-
tectable way (poisoning attack). In this study, we attempt a
different form of attack, known as model extraction. This is
where an adversary tries to steal an underlying model, given
only API access to the victim model’s predicted labels.
In a relational setting, we additionally need to address is-
sues associated with querying the model. Unlike neural net-
work extraction on iid data, we need to modify the underly-
ing graph in order to obtain new label information from the
victim. Graph modifications can be in the form of adding
or deleting adversarial nodes, as well as modifying exist-
ing node’s features. This is typically more expensive for the
model provider, more effort for the adversary, and more sus-
picious when repeated a large number of times when com-
pared to the propositional setting.
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For example, consider a GNN trained for the task of node
classification (predicting a label for each node) on a social
network. Typically, individuals are able to modify their own
node’s features and edges, and create a limited number of
new nodes. Without the ability to query the model a sig-
nificantly large number of times, extraction becomes more
difficult. Additionally, we must consider typical properties
of social networks. One common property is homophily:
users naturally fall into different communities. This further
increases the difficulty of model extraction, as GNNs build
a node’s latent representation according to the features of
its neighbors. Adding a handful of adversarial nodes with
features representative of a different class might not signifi-
cantly alter the original neighborhood’s feature distribution,
causing the underlying victim GNN to return the same labels
for this neighborhood, and thus be uninformative for the task
of model extraction.
In this paper, we follow a learning based extraction ap-
proach, which we extend to GNNs. This strategy involves
learning a new model which trains on data labeled by the
victim. More specifically, we learn our model extraction
by iteratively perturbing a subgraph of the victim model’s
original graph, and training our extraction over different in-
stances of these perturbed subgraphs, whose nodes are la-
beled by the victim GCN. We make the following contribu-
tions:
1. We introduce the novel problem of GNN model extrac-
tion, present a preliminary approach for model extraction,
analyze various considerations and assumptions in the ap-
proach, and discuss directions for future progress.
2. We learn graph convolutional network (GCN) extractions
of victims trained on two datasets: Cora and Pubmed.
Our extraction achieves approximately 80% fidelity de-
spite having access to only a subgraph of the entire train-
ing graph.
Our empirical evaluation is currently limited, as extending
existing approaches that extract non relational models to our
setting is not trivial. We could consider a query to our black
box GNN as adding an edgeless node, which would allow
for independent queries. This is highly suspicous however,
as this requires adding too many edgeless nodes, which is
not typical behavior. Therefore, we cannot find any suitable
baselines for comparison, and exclude baselines from our
evaluation.
The remainder of this paper focuses on our preliminary al-
gorithm and results for learning a high fidelity GNN extrac-
tion, along with an extended discussion on our assumptions,
limitations of our approach, and future directions.
Related Work
Model extraction has been studied in a variety of differ-
ent contexts. One of the earlier works by Trame`r et al.
(2016) defines extraction attacks such as equation solv-
ing on logistic regression, and path finding on decision
trees. Orekondy, Schiele, and Fritz (2019) develop a rein-
forcement learning approach to select samples to train the
extraction on. Oh, Schiele, and Fritz (2019) learn a meta-
learner over different neural network architectures to ex-
tract the victim’s architecture. Wang and Gong (2018) de-
velop an approach to steal the hyperparameters of a model
when given access to the training dataset and ML algorithm.
Milli et al. (2018) develop a method of model extraction us-
ing gradient explanations. Less victim queries are needed
when provided input gradients, as they are more informa-
tive than labels. Jagielski et al. (2019) discuss limitations of
learning based approaches, and introduces a functionally-
equivalent extraction attack on a neural network with 1 hid-
den layer. None of these approaches considers non-iid data.
Another interesting work by Chandrasekaran et al. (2020)
shows that the model extraction setting is equivalent to ac-
tive learning in the query synthesis setting, where the learner
can generate any instance within the input space and re-
quest a label from an oracle. This means that solutions
from active learning can be (and have been) applied to the
task of model extraction. Again, these active learning ap-
proaches are designed for non-relational data. While some
works do study active learning for GNNs (Wu et al. 2019;
Cai, Zheng, and Chang 2017; Gao et al. 2018), we leave ac-
tive learning solutions for GNN extraction as future work.
There has been progress in adversarial attacks on GNNs.
Zu¨gner, Akbarnejad, and Gu¨nnemann (2018) perform a poi-
soning attack, where they are cautious of the perturbing de-
gree and feature distributions to avoid detection. This is rel-
evant to our problem, where we want to retrieve different
subgraph samples without being detected as malicious.
Model Extraction of GNNs
Problem Statement
We aim to solve the following: Given API access to some
GNN performing node classification on graphG = (A,X),
learn a high fidelity extraction of this GNN.
More specifically, we have access to a small subgraph
Gs = (As, Xs) ⊂ G, where As is the adjacency matrix
and Xs contains a feature vector of each node in its rows
of our subset. We have the ability to change features, edges,
and add new adversarial nodes in Gs, but can’t access other
nodes in G. We can use the victim model f to get the labels
of nodes inGs. We want to perturbGs a minimal number of
times, in an undetectable manner, such that we learn enough
about f to learn a high fidelity extraction g.
Subgraph Sampling Algorithm
Algorithm 1 provides pseudocode for learning our extracted
model g. We assume multinomial distributions F andM as
prior knowledge, and consider the case where each node has
sparse binary features, as is true in citation networks. We
first make samples of Gs by sampling its number and type
of features for each node in Gs from our prior distributions
for each class, as defined inGenerateSample().We do this to
capture global information of the graph. For a high fidelity
extraction, we need to train our extraction on a graph which
contains labels from each class predicted by the victim. We
also add edges to our subgraph such that it is complete. This
is motivated in our discussion.We next save each node’s new
labels from f , along with the 2-hop adjacency matrix and
feature matrix from our sample of Gs. We train g over our
set of sampled adjacency matricies, by combining the sam-
pled adjacency matricies into one block diagonal matrix for
training over multiple graphs (Kipf and Welling 2017). We
use cross-entropy loss to train our extracted model, which
we discuss in further detail in the next section.
Approximating Inaccessible Neighbors
An issue with Algorithm 1 is that our extraction g is trained
on labels that are based on information not present in our
graph samples. This is because victim labels of nodes not
in the center of our sample are also predicted by informa-
tion from inaccessible nodes (3 and 4 hops away from the
center of our 2-hop subgraph). We extend our algorithm to
approximate these inaccessible nodes for each subgraph we
generate. This approximation comes at no additional cost in
terms of stealth or victim queries, as we are only adding
these nodes to our internal training samples, not the origi-
nal graph.We provide pseudocode in Algorithm 2. Note that
we use ρ = 2 in our experiments, and each new node is
connected to multiple nodes in our sample.
Analyzing Modeling Considerations
In this section, we discuss various aspects of our algorithm
and the potential limitations of our assumptions. We also
note some interesting empirical observations that guide our
approach.
Variance of Feature Distributions Our graph samples
consist of nodes sampled from the same multinomial distri-
bution. This assumes that each node of a class can be char-
acterized by a single multinomial distribution over features,
which likely is not the case in real-world scenarios. Because
these feature distributions are constructed by prior knowl-
edge, there is likely a bias towards certain groups of features.
To introduce noise, for each feature we sample from Fc,
there is a probability ǫ that we select a different random fea-
ture. While our preliminary results indicate that fidelity is
highest with no noise (ǫ = 0), we suspect introducing noise
could help in better capturing information not encoded in
our prior distributions.
Loss In this work, we assume that the victim model re-
turns a probability distribution over classes. Our extracted
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for extracting model g,
given a 2-hop subgraph, and API access to f
Input: 2-hop subgraphGs
API access to victim f
Each class’s feature distribution F
Each class’s number of features distributionM
Number of graph samples per class n
Number of classes C
Output: Extracted model g
1 SA = {As}
2 SX = {Xs}
3 SL = {f(Gs)}
4 for i← 1 to n do
5 for c← 1 to C do
6 Ac, Xc = GenerateSample(Fc,Mc, As)
7 SA = SA ∪ Ac
8 SX = SX ∪Xc
9 Perturb nodes in G according to Ac andXc
10 SL = SL ∪ f(Gs)
11 AG = diagonal block matrix with all elements in SA
12 XG = row-wise concatenation of all elements in SX
13 Train 2-layer GCN g, given adjacencyAG, features
XG, and labels SL
14 return g
15
16 Function GenerateSample(Fc,Mc, As):
17 Ac = Complete graph with same nodes asAs
18 Xc = 0
19 for i← 1 to |As| do
20 m ∼Mc
21 for j ← 1 to m do
22 x ∼ Fc
23 Xc[i, x] = 1
24 return Ac, Xc
Algorithm 2: Approximate inaccessible nodes for
samples that extraction g will train on.
1 Function ApproximateNodes(Gc):
2 L = f(Gc)
3 center = center node in Gc
4 for n ∈ Gc \ center do
5 Dn = Ln − Lcenter
6 for c ∈ C do
7 if Dnc > 0 then
8 Each subgraph node needs
Dnc ∗ ρ ∗Degree(n) nodes added per
class.
9 Create new nodes for each non-center subgraph
node.
10 return Gc
model’s loss function should then use the victim’s probabil-
ity distributions as the true label. We use cross-entropy loss:
L = −
∑
n∈Gs
C∑
c=1
f(n)c ln g(n)c
where f(n)c is the victim’s probability of node n belong-
ing to class c. Surprisingly, our preliminary results indicate
that our extracted model has higher fidelity when we con-
sider f(n) as a one-hot vector, with the largest probabil-
ity class as the prediction. This is unintuitive, as we expect
runner-up class probabilities to provide valuable insight as
to how the victim makes predictions.
We also consider the case where we know the true labels
of the dataset, and balance training the model between ex-
tracting a high fidelity model, and an accurate model:
L = −
∑
n∈Gs
C∑
c=1
Ync ln g(n)c −
∑
n∈Gs
C∑
c=1
f(n)c ln g(n)c
where Ync ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if node n belongs to class c.
Being that the victim model is trained on true labels, our
intuition is that we want our extracted model to follow a
similar procedure, in the hopes of learning a similar model.
Our results so far indicate that including true labels does not
improve fidelity.
Analyzing Assumptions
Belowwe discuss our assumptions, their limitations, and po-
tential to relax them.
Stealth We make the assumption that we can perturb our
2-hop graph in any way, going undetected. Our results indi-
cate that for a simple 2 layer GCN extraction on Cora, for
some nodes, it takes up to 100 samples per class, or 700
total samples just to achieve 82% fidelity. Aside from sus-
picion raised due to the number of perturbations, each in-
stance of our graph perturbations are highly suspicious as
well. Perturbing the graph for one sample involves severely
altering the degree distribution and feature distributions of
nodes within our 2-hop subgraph. In particular, line 17 of
Algorithm 1 adds edges to our 2-hop window until it is a
complete subgraph. We make such perturbations in order to
outweigh the influence of nodes 3 and 4 hops away, which
we have no access to. Otherwise, if our subgraph is sparsely
connected, the victim’s aggregation function might receive
greater influence from inaccessible nodes, and thus their la-
bels would not capture enough global graph information that
our perturbations are attempting to represent.
Zu¨gner, Akbarnejad, and Gu¨nnemann (2018) perform a
poisoning attack with less noticeable perturbations. For ex-
ample, when perturbing the graph, they ensure that the de-
gree distribution still closely follows the power law distribu-
tion (a typical degree distribution that graphs tend to natu-
rally follow). Additionally, they set a limit on the number of
allowed perturbations, and preserve feature co-occurrence.
While we are operating with access to a significantly lim-
ited portion of the graph, these ideas can still be extended to
GNN extraction attacks.
Architecture Our assumption of a 2-layer GCN is overly
simplifying and this might not be the case in production.
While Oh, Schiele, and Fritz (2019) learns the model archi-
tecture for neural networks on iid data with a meta-learner,
extending this approach to GNNs is not trivial, due to issues
we face with querying our relational victim, compared to a
victim operating on iid data.
Access to Node Neighbors Our assumption of having full
access to a 2-hop subgraph can be true in theory, but would
be unrealistic in practice. It is common for people to have
hundreds of friends in a social network. Therefore, we would
need ≈ 10,000 cooperating users just for a 2-hop subgraph.
To circumvent this, one idea we are considering in the near
future is to learn our extraction entirely based on a disjoint
subgraph of adversarial nodes we add. This has many addi-
tional implications, which we leave for future work.
Priors Prior knowledge of each class’s feature distribution
is another simplifying assumption. Consider the case where
we have a large citation network with 1000 classes. In this
case it might be too unrealistic or expensive to obtain good
prior feature distributions for each class.
Experiments
We train our victim GCN f on the Cora and Pubmed cita-
tion network datasets (Sen et al. 2008), for the task of node
classification:
1. Cora contains 2708 labeled nodes, each of which has 1
of 7 possible labels. We train our victim on 140 of these
nodes.
2. Pubmed contains 19717 labeled nodes, each of which has
1 of 3 possible labels. We train our victim on 60 of these
nodes.
Each node represents a scientific paper, and each binary
feature determines whether some dictionary word is in the
paper or not. Two papers are linked if one of the papers
cites the other. Many GNN architectures consider the graph
as undirected by default. We therefore consider our citation
networks as undirected, as a convienience. Although our al-
gorithm works with any GNN architecture, in this work we
focus on GCN. Note that we can’t compare against base-
lines, as GNN extraction has not previously been considered.
Next, we randomly select a node with a 2-hop neighbor-
hood size of at least 10, but no larger than 150. A subgraph
with fewer than 10 nodes does not contain enough informa-
tion, while a subgraph larger than 150 nodes takes longer to
extract a model from, and is more suspicious. We get our
multinomial prior distributions F and M by taking the fre-
quency of each feature per class, and number of features per
node and class respectively, and normalize. We assume ac-
cess to this node’s 2-hop subgraph, and we run our extraction
algorithm to train g.
Once we train g on our different samples of Gs, we mea-
sure its fidelity to f by predicting over the entire original
graph G, and determining what percentage of labels g pre-
dicted the same as f . Note that this is a different task from
learning an accurate model. We learn g strictly to match the
predictions of f , regardless of whether f is making accurate
predictions.
Node ID
Number Sub-
graph Nodes
Fidelity
503 17.0 0.75
1174 32.0 0.80
102 23.0 0.79
738 116.0 0.80
1977 21.0 0.80
2218 11.0 0.64
321 141.0 0.78
560 59.0 0.80
343 23.0 0.79
2317 16.0 0.75
AVG 45.9 0.77
Table 1: Fidelity of extracted model g, when varying the
accessible subgraph. Using 10 samples per class on Cora
dataset.
Dataset
Node
ID
Number Sub-
graph Nodes
Samples
per Class
Fidelity
Cora
675 48 1 0.67
675 48 3 0.79
675 48 5 0.82
675 48 10 0.81
675 48 100 0.83
1956 13 1 0.36
1956 13 3 0.71
1956 13 5 0.75
1956 13 10 0.81
1956 13 100 0.82
Pubmed
3028 16 1 0.67
3028 16 7 0.72
3028 16 11 0.76
3028 16 23 0.80
3028 16 233 0.83
12759 75 1 0.72
12759 75 7 0.80
12759 75 11 0.80
12759 75 23 0.81
12759 75 233 0.82
Table 2: Results on varying the samples per class over the
same nodes. Note that Pubmed has only 3 classes, which
means we need more Pubmed samples per class to match
the number of samples our algorithm is using to train g on
Cora.
Table 1 contains results over 10 random nodes in Cora,
where we use 10 samples per class, or 70 total samples. A
sample refers to a particular perturbation of the 2-hop graph,
which represents some class, and is present in the block di-
agonal matrix. We must have at least 1 sample per class in
order for our extraction to be able to learn over all classes.
This table indicates that access to small portions of the graph
can achieve up to 80% fidelity, when following our strong
assumptions. This helps us understand that a small number
of subgraph samples each representing a different class is
enough to possibly perform a successful model extraction.
Our average subgraph size of 45.9 nodes consists of 1.7% of
all nodes in Cora.
Table 2 varies the number of samples per class, keeping
the node constant. Our results confirm that our extraction
achieves higher fidelity with more samples. Additionally, we
see that for larger subgraphs we have a relatively high fi-
delity for few samples, which only gradually improves with
more samples. The reverse is true for nodes with small sub-
graphs; we have a low fidelity with few samples, which dra-
matically improves with more samples. Experiments with
other nodes confirm this pattern. From these results, we
see that when the victim provides more label information,
whether its through larger subgraphs, or more samples, fi-
delity improves up to ≈ 80% fidelity.
Conclusion and Future Work
We present a preliminary case study of model extraction in
GNNs. We present a simple solution that can achieve ap-
proximately 80% fidelity on 2 citation networks. We also
provide a detailed discussion of different assumptions and
modeling considerations.Weakening these assumptions, and
applying these ideas can potentially improve our attack, such
that it is more realistic in practice, and achieves a higher fi-
delity extraction. Below, we present new directions to con-
sider:
1. Jagielski et al. (2019) discuss a functionally equivalent
approach to model extraction, which avoids the funda-
mental issue of non-determinisim plauged by learning
based approaches. We plan to study how this can be ex-
tended to GNNs.
2. We are training our GCN on a fake graph of samples
which is substantially different from what we are test-
ing on to measure fidelity. GCN is transductive, and thus
has not been designed for the task of predicting unseen
nodes well. This is motivation to experiment with induc-
tive GNNs more suitable to predicting unseen nodes, such
as GraphSAGE (Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec 2017).
3. We need a scalable model extraction approach, that uses
a sufficiently small portion of the graph with a limited
number of perturbations. Although our experiments use
a small fraction of nodes in the dataset (up to 0.38% in
Pubmed), this percentage increases with denser graphs.
Furthermore, obtaining accurate prior distributions over
features is more costly as the number of nodes and classes
increases.
4. Consider the case where our GNN provides explana-
tions along with our predictions, using a technique such
as GNN Explainer (Ying et al. 2019). Just as Milli et al.
(2018) discuss how to take advantage of gradient expla-
nations for model extraction attacks, we can consider how
to use GNN explanations to improve fidelity.
5. In this work, we only consider stealing GNNs for the task
of node classification. We plan to extend this to other tasks
such as link prediction and graph classification.
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